While South African politicians are presently trying to assist the birth of a 'new South A frica' through negotiations it would perhaps not be inappropriate to let these three publications take their places around a negotiating table to ham m er out some sort of a consensus in respect of a 'South A frican' view of Scripture -or to identify the stumbling blocks in the way of such a 'united' view of Scripture.
a meaningful South African dialogue on Scripture.
On my desk lie three recent publications dealing with the Bible and biblical herm e neutics (M osala 1989; Potgieter 1989; Van Wyk 1990) , each grappling with the dis cussion in the relevant author's theological tradition in South Africa. Mosala discus ses the situation in black theology, Potgieter provides us with a D utch Reform ed view, and Van Wyk writes on the discussion within the Reform ed Churches (G ereformeerde Kerke).
While South African politicians are presently trying to assist the birth of a 'new South A frica' through negotiations it would perhaps not be inappropriate to let these three publications take their places around a negotiating table to ham m er out some sort of a consensus in respect of a 'South A frican' view of Scripture -or to identify the stumbling blocks in the way of such a 'united' view of Scripture.
I shall first discuss the three publications and then try to determ ine their diffe rences, in order to form ulate the areas of disagreem ent. For the sake of conve nience I shall present my own translation of quotations from the Afrikaans texts.
1. VAN WYK (1990) Van Wyk presents us with a clearly written book in which the views of other (R e form ed) scholars are presented in all fairness, and in which some older views of m em bers of the G ereform eerde Kerke (GK), such as those of the well-known J D du Toit (Totius), are overtly criticised. Van Wyk's rejection of reformed orthodoxy's view of Scripture already indicates a sharp departure from earlier G K views. An example can illustrate the point. In the well-known Du Plessis trial of the Dutch R eform ed Church, J D du Toit hailed reform ed orthodoxy as the golden age of re formed theology (Die Kerksaak 1932:128) :
W ith regard to the term 'scholasticism' I would say this: if used in a positive sense I can go along with it, since the m en concerned were people writing in the bloom ing period of o ur theology and our R e form ed Church...Unfortunately the term 'scholasticism' is often used in a negative sense...The men who worked after Calvin, were the R e form ed scholastics, in so far as they worked out further and broader the principles laid down by Calvin. They were, therefore, not scholas tics in the negative sense of the word. I can m ention Amesius.,.1 can also mention Voetius, and others.
Van Wyk (1990:10) says about this period:
R evelation was intellectualistically identified with a series o f truths... T he criterion governing orthodox views of Scripture was...a com pre hensive doctrinal system; an epistem ological formalisation of Scrip tural authority was constructed, and the connection between salvatio nal authority and the scopos of Scripture became obsolete...Typical of the time is...Voetius, who subscribing to a rigid mechanical view of in spiration, polemised against Calvin's doctrine of Scripture.
W hat Du T oit regarded as the 'golden age' of R eform ed theology Van Wyk thus views as a period of stagnation. Likewise, Du Toit {Die Kerksaak 1932:128) lashes out against 'higher criticism' -because it 'is unscientific' -and dodges the question of w hether one can regard the Bible as the W ord of G od and, at the sam e time, accept that it contains m istakes of chronology (Die Kerksaak 1932:136-137) ; Van Wyk (1990:61-62 -cf 44-46) , however, affirms: 'A [historical] critical approach thus does not imply theological liberalism undermining the authority of Scripture.'
This difference of opinion and the am ount o f disagreem ent among present-day GK theologians on the question of the real nature of scriptural authority do not, ac cording to Van Wyk (1990:31-32, 60-61) , am ount to 'alarm ing tension' am ong GK theologians in South Africa.
1.1 The key concept V an Wyk first traces the Reform ed view of Scripture from Augustine, through Cal vin, Bavinck, and Berkouwer to present-day theologians o f the GK. The key con cept in this overview is revelation, divine revelation (Van Wyk 1990:46) : (Van Wyk 1990:47-48) and professed by believers. For that rea son any theory of inspiration or inerrancy trying to formally secure the divine nature of the Bible's contents is to be rejected. Consequently, reformed scholasticism and fundamentalism have to be rejected (Van Wyk 1990:43) . By the same token any attem pt at interpreting the Bible without the premise of faith in the Bible as divine revelation, that is, any attem pt at rendering the Bible a mere human book or document containing human experience of (or reaction to) di vine revelation, is to be rejected (Van Wyk 1990:60) . The Bible can only be understood and used properly by a person committed to the faith to which the Bible invites him. Concepts such as sola Scriptura, canon, the inspiration, authority, clarity and trustworthiness of Scripture cannot be discussed in the abstract, that is, apart from the function of Scripture in the community of be lievers, since these concepts stand in the closest relation to the message of salvation proclaimed by the biblical texts. The Bible should, however, not be viewed as 'inerrant' -at least not when 'iner rancy' refers to modern-day historical consistency and accuracy (Van Wyk 1990:30) .
To add 'inerrancy' to the 'trustworthiness' of the Bible would require a mechanical view of biblical inspiration. The Bible indeed contains 'mistakes', or rather a certain amount of 'irregularity' (oneffenhede) (Van Wyk 1990:45-46) . Because Scripture can only be called the infallible Word of G od in the context o f the Bible's function (that is, in the context of the explication of the Bible under the enlightm ent by the Holy Spirit), and not in abstracto, it would be fundamentalistic to speak of 'biblical p ro o f (Skrifbewys) for this or that view -as was done in the case of a few synodal decisions of the past (V an Wyk 1990:56-58) , where the Bible only had to supply the 'p ro o f for a view already agreed upon before listening to the Bible. An exegetical biblical view or pronouncem ent invoked in support of theologi cal and ecclesiastical argum ents should rath e r be looked upon as an 'appeal to Scripture' {Skrifberoep) (Van Wyk 1990:55) , since the exposition of Scripture -alhough done under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit -remains human work.
In appealing to Scripture theologians should never try to invoke Scriptural support for any m atter that lies outside the (salvation-historical) scopus of biblical authority; be critically aware of the presuppositions flowing from their faith and culture (Van Wyk 1990:37, 56) ; be conscious of their epistemological point of departure that could 'colour' their conclusions (Van Wyk 1990:31, 37 ); adhere to certain rules for sound exegesis (Van Wyk 1990:51-54) ; and be alert to the danger of 'conclusivism' (i e viewing anything that can be logical ly deduced from Scripture as scriptural revelation - Van Wyk 1990:53) .
3 Discussion n terms of the classical or orthodox Reformed view of Scripture, Van Wyk's articuate exposition indeed makes pleasant reading. His insistance that the Bible is a religious document, that the faith of Bible readers plays a major role in their interpretation of bibli cal texts -indeed, that faith provides the basis for all biblical interpretation, that theology should not be done in abstracto, but from within the context of the believing community, that obedience to the message of Scripture is of greater importance than 'ortho dox' theological theories, hould be welcomed and taken seriously, as should also his functional definitions of authority, infallibility, clarity and such Reform ed thought categories. Likewise, his sensitivity for our African context (Van Wyk 1990:38) and the implied warning that we should not be practising theology from a 'white' perspective only, should be ap plauded.
The B 3^ in discussicm
The questions Van Wyk puts to Van Huyssteen (1986) Furtherm ore, if our knowledge of revelation -in spite of the enlightm ent from the Holy Spirit -can remain 'subjective', how was it possible for the biblical authors to remain untouched by this typically hum an 'subjectiveness'? If their witness in deed rem ained untouched by th eir subjectivity, w ere they th e n not o f necessity mechanically employed? If 'inspiration' and 'enlightm ent' both are the work of the same Holy Spirit, why should they differ qualitatively? A re we not, in o rd er to answer these questions, forced to pay attention to the nature of human knowledge, and therefore to philosophical epistemology?
PO TG IE T ER (1989)
Potgieter's book covers virtually the same ground as Van Wyk's. However, Potgieter w rites from the perspective of the trad itio n of the D utch R eform ed C hurch (DRC). His book also contains, as an addendum , a document accepted in 1986 by the G eneral Synod of the D RC as a guide for its m em bers on Scriptural authority and the use of Scripture.
Although Potgieter (1989:5) explicitly states that the synodal document was ac cepted as a guide for members of the DRC, he does not elaborate on the point. In term s of the history of the D RC it may, however, be im portant to note that such a docum ent can never acquire official status, in the sense th a t while it voices the DRC's official dogma on Scripture, people (especially ministers of the DRC) deviat * 'A church functioning on the basis of a dubious authority should...expect to be come irrelevant...' (Potgieter 1989:5) .
* 'A fter the fall G od's om nipotence and love had been revealed in the form of a coercive authority...' (Potgieter 1989:7) .
* 'The m aintenance of authority is indispensible for the existence and continua tion of good order' (Potgieter 1989:7) .
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* 'W ithout authority and faith...reIigion and theology cannot exist' (Potgieter 1989: 8) .
'...the spiritual trade mark of liberalism -on which presentday modernist theo logy foots -is...the rejection of authority' (Potgieter 1989:11) . 'T he authority with which m inisters preach is the authority o f the acting and speaking G od him self (Potgieter 1989:12) .
'M inisters of the W ord ordained in an ecclesiatical office have the special task of proclaiming the Word of G od with authority' (Potgieter 1989:13) .
T h a t we are living in a world in which authority is being questioned on all fronts -including the ecclesiastical-religious aren a -cannot be denied' (Potgieter 1989:14) .
'T here is but one ground for the authority of Holy Scripture, namely its divine origin' (Potgieter 1989:17) .
'If a preacher should proclaim the Word of the Lord with authority the contents of his serm on cannot say anything else than what the W ord of the Lord says' (Potgieter 1989:38) .
'The result of believers' reflection on Scriptural revelation under the guidance of the Holy Spirit has over time been formulated as dogmas by the church...and are also endowed with authority' (Potgieter 1989:57) .
I raised the question above (1.3) w hether Van Wyk's emphasis on 'objective' revela tion was not a covert plea for the restoration of a particular form of authority. In the case of Potgieter there is no doubt whatsoever. To him authority lies at the root of any (sound) view of Scripture.
The argument
A uthority implies a relationship betw een a superior and an inferior p artner (Pot gieter 1989:7-8) . This also applies to divine authority, which forms the context with in which we speak about scriptural authority. Contrary to Roman Catholic tradition, where authority is seated in the church, and Pentecostalism, where authority is seat ed in the Holy Spirit's guidance of the individual, and m odernism's rejection of all forms of authority, 'R eform ed Protestantism views Scripture as the infallible Word of God endowed with conclusive authority, the source of all true knowledge and the unquestionable norm for doctrine and conduct' (Potgieter 1989:8-12) . T herefore preachers have a responsibility to preach the Word with authority.
The authoritative W ord of G od has different shapes ('gestaltes'): the revealed W ord (Jesus C hrist), the w ritten W ord (the Bible) and the proclaim ed W ord (the preaching by the church) (Potgieter 1989:15) . Through the inspiration of the Holy The Biife m dKOKSMa Spirit, who ensured that the biblical authors understood and represented G od's re vealed Word correctly, the Bible presents us with the 'fixed form' of G od's infallible Word, and it is this fixed form that has preserved the Word of G od in all purity (Potgieter 1989:15-24) . The biblical authors did not 'experience' the word of G od -in which case their writings would contain a subjective elem ent -but received it (Potgieter 1989:34). The fact that ordinary human beings wrote the Bible, therefore, did not lead to a Bible bound to those times and cultures ('tydgebonde/kultuurgebonde'). A t most one could say th at the product of inspiration was tim e and culture oriented ('tydbetrokke/kultuurbetrokke') (Potgieter 1989:26) . The truth contained in the Bible is thus not a (subjective and relative) 'relational truth' but the objective truth (Potgieter 1989:35) .
While the Holy Spirit inspired the biblical authors to write down the pure Word of G od (Potgieter 1989:26) he gives the reader the understanding to read the pure W ord of G od from the Bible (Potgieter 1989:28 ). Yet, because of the total depra vity of humankind, not all interpretations of the Bible lead to the discovery of the Word of God. It is only when the Bible is interpreted correctly that it can lead to the establishm ent of the authoritative truth (Potgieter 1989:28) . Therefore we have to devise rules -deduced from Scripture itself (Potgieter 1989:32, 33 ) -for the correct interpretation of Scripture (Potgieter 1989:29) . Even though there is no infallible method of interpretation (Potgieter 1989:51) , such rules should at least take into ac count that the Holy Spirit inspired the biblical authors with a particular goo/, which was not to present us with a 'historically correct, literal representation of the words of Jesus, but to bring home to us a particular divine truth' or 'message' (Potgieter 1989:30, 44) . Such rules should also pay attention to the literary, linguistic and theo logical context of biblical pronouncem ents. Because such skills are required the Word can never be severed from the 'interpreting church' (Potgieter 1989:53) and interpretation always requires a 'sound dogmatic basis' (Potgieter 1989:57) .
When the Bible has been interpreted correctly the preaching flowing from such interpretation can also be called 'the W ord of G od' (P otgieter 1989:36-38 ). Yet, faith in the W ord of G od can only be created through the work of the Holy Spirit (Potgieter 1989:40) .
It is only as long as the Bible remains the cornerstone of preaching that we can hope to proclaim the Word of God. When present-day societal problem s provide the starting point for the p reparation of a serm on -as in the case of 'contextual theology' -we cannot speak of true proclamation any longer (Potgieter 1989:45-46) .
True proclamation has to base itself on the explicatio of Scripture which can then be applied to our present-day situation (Potgieter 1989:56-57) . Potgieter does his best to base his conception of authority on the 'objectivity' of the Bible and its message: as divine Word it must be authoritative. In order to uphold this prem ise he has to 'objectivise' the Word of G od and truth, limit hum an acitivity in the inscripturation and interpretation of the Bible to an absolute minimum, and treat the term 'Word of G od' in purely abstract terms.
His argument sometimes runs into contradictions. O n the one hand he acknow ledges that every biblical author retained 'his own set of m em ories', used 'his own sources and was limited by his own horizon of knowledge and fram e of reference' (Potgieter 1989:30) . All these assertions im p\yfiill human involvement in the writ ing of the Bible. But if this is true and if words have meaning, how can the product of their writing remain 'objective'? But even if one would grant him this notion of objectivity, his argum ent runs into new difficulties when it comes to the interpretation of Scripture. Consider the following statem ents (my emphasis):
'It is, of course, true that truth hcis relational aspects, but as such truth is not re lational' (Potgieter 1989:35) .
'Scripture does not become true when it is heard and faithfully known by a per son, but is true because it is the Word of G od' (Potgieter 1989:35) .
'Objective clarity as a characteristic of Scripture necessarily follows from the per fection of G od's work' (Potgieter 1989:50) .
'Scripture is not unclear in itself. It is the reader's poor insight that prevents him from understanding what was m eant' (Potgieter 1989: 50) .
'The basic cause of different interpretations of Scripture is the obscuration of the human mind as a result of the fall. The problem most definitely does not lie with Holy Scripture. A s iVord o f G od it is absolutely clear...' (Potgieter 1989: 28) .
* 'Even if we always have to say, "In the light of our present knowledge we under stand [Scripture] as saying..." truth as such is not relativised' (Potgieter 1989:51) .
The Bible is here isolated from its readers and, as it were, viewed in a vacuum. In spite of Potgieter's (1989:32) A lthough P otgieter adm its (1989:28), 'W hen a person...reads or studies the Bible, he necessarily does so with particular presuppositions', he does not reflect on the implications of this statem ent for his own argum ent at all, for if it is true that reading the Bible necessarily involves human presuppositions, it renders superfluous the b attle for the 'objectivity' o f the truth contained in the Bible, for w hat is the sense of 'objective' truth if there exists a rift betw een the Bible and its m odem rea ders (Potgieter 1989:49) , if truth can only be known via human involvement and if human involvement necessarily proceeds from presuppositions?
Potgieter would perhaps argue that a specific set of presuppositions and exegetical rules (P otgieter 1989:29, 32, 33) can gu aran tee the co rrect in terp retatio n of Scripture. But how do we arrive at such correct rules? Potgieter (1989:32, 33 ) a r gues that such rules, to be correct, should be derived from Scripture itself. But this is begging the question, since if we have to derive exegetical rules from Scripture we have to interpret the Bible. But to interpret Scripture we need correct rules.... Potgieter runs into m ore difficulties with this line of argum ent when he rejects such 'Scripturally' attested procedures as pneum atic and allegorical interpretation (Potgieter 1989:32) , and states that 'there is no infallible method for the interpreta tion of Scripture' (Potgieter 1989:51) . A part from the fact that a complete dependance on the Holy Spirit contradicts the call for sound exegetical methods, it is debatable whether this app>eal for enlight m ent by the Spirit really solves the problem of correct Scriptural interpretation, since Potgieter (1989:38) also asserts that not all preaching of the Word necessarily reflects the Word of God, because one cannot say for sure w hether this illumination by the Holy Spirit has indeed taken place in a particular instance (Potgieter 1989: 47) .
F E D á s t The Bible io discussion
If we do not have an infallible method of exegesis and cannot be sure that we have been guided by the Spirit in our interpretation, what is the practical sense of affirming the objective authority of Scripture?
To me the problem with Potgieters's argument lies in the uncritically presuppos ed naive realistic epistemology with its distinction betw een 'objective' and 'subjec tive' knowledge. This naive view implies no less a particular philosophical view of truth than it does the idea of 'relational' truth, which Potgieter (1989:34) rejects be cause o f its philosophical nature.
A lthough V an Wyk argues m ore carefully and lays much m ore stress on the Bible in function the problem with the overall argum ent remains the same: the mo m ent the 'objective' W ord of God (or revelation) is comprehended by humans, it be comes, as it were, 'mixed up' with our presuppositions, and -to use the same term i nology -therefore 'subjective'. The checks and balances Potgieter builds into his ar gument to avoid this inevitability do not help us out of the dilemma, for there is no infallible exegetical m ethod to ensure correct interpretation of the objective Word, and one cannot be sure w hether any particular interpreter has in fact been guided by the Spirit. The argum ent presented to uphold the 'hard' form of authority he set out to protect thus does not w arrant the conclusion. Perhaps the problem lies not only with the presupposed epistemology, but also with the presupposed contents of the concept of authority. Mosala views biblical texts not as containing divinely revealed and infallibly in spired, and therefore authoritative, pronouncements, but as the products of ancient class struggles. 'The form of biblical-herm eneutical ap propriation suggested in these chapters,' M osala (1989:11) asserts, 'is deliberately oblivious to the notion of "scriptural authority" which is at the heart of traditional biblical scholarship.' This choice is based on the m aterialist insight th at ideas, and therefore also texts, 'are productions or "signifying practices" that reconstitute in very specific ways the realities of the material conditions o f which they are products' (M osala 1989:7).
For instance, Mosala (1989:10) argues, traditional biblical scholarship's quest for the historicity and authorial integrity of biblical texts 'defme(s] a herm eneutical method rooted in contemp)orary W estern ruling-class anxiety about authenticity'. Similarly, certain biblical pronouncem ents reflect the ideas of ancient ruling classes bent upon maintaining the social status quo, while others reflect the struggle o f the oppressed and poor for liberation from the hegemony of the ruling classes.
In order to be able to read the Bible in a truly liberating manner, one thus has to be aware of the fact that not all biblical texts are liberating in nature. To get to the authentic biblical message of liberation one has to discern which texts or portions of texts originated from the struggle of the oppressed for liberation.
2 The argum ent
People's reading of the Bible -w hether they are black or white -M osala (1989:3) asserts, 'is framed by their history and culture'. He therefore consciously chooses a (m aterialist) hermeneutical model that can expose the class, ideological and cultural assumptions underlying not only models of biblical interpretation, but also biblical texts themselves.
'Black theology has exploded the myth of rational objectivity in theology, which presumes to preclude cultural and ideological conditioning' (Mosala 1989:13 ). Yet, many black liberation theologians have uncritically taken their exegetical starting point in the notion 'that the Bible is the revealed Word of G od' (M osala 1989:15) , a notion carrying the implication that there is such a thing as a non-ideological appro priation of Scripture, to which there is but one response, namely obedience. At best, every-day human experience can be seen in the light of the Word of God, but not vice versa (Mosala 1989:17) .
Viewed in this way the Bible becomes an ahistorical interclassist document, the truth of which is not historical, cultural and economic, but eternal and has to be 'applied to' or 'contextualised in' particular situations (see Potgieter 1989:54-57) .
But the relevance of the Bible's message does not flow from its idealistically con strued universality. On the contrary, its relevance issues from its very character as a historical, cultural, political and economic product (M osala 1989:19-20) . The bibli cal texts bear the marks of their origins and history, marks which are effectively con
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The Bible in discussioo cealed by the notion of the Bible as the eternal Word of G od and by the harm onisa tions of cultural and ideological differences in these texts (Mosala 1989:20) .
Through its uncritical acceptance of the ideological assum ptions of classical W estern theology, black theology has fallen prey to the idea of a universal, ahistorical, non-ideological W ord of G od that has to be 'applied' to concrete life situations (M osala 1989:22) . This has caused black theologians to use the Bible very selective ly w ithout having been able to tell why they chose certain and glossed over other sections of the Bible (Mosala 1989:11,17-18) .
However, by consciously taking 'the struggle' as the herm eneutical 'lens' it be comes possible to recognize the oppressor and oppression in the biblical lexis them selves (M osala 1989:26) . And it is necessary to do so, since the reason why the ruling classes and oppressors can lay claim to 'biblical support' for their exploitation and oppression is that such conduct can in fact be biblically underscored (Mosala 1989: 27) . For instance, the texts on David and Solomon reveal a G od of 'law and order' supporting oppressive measures (Mosala 1989:17) . Such a theology is incompatible w ith, for instance, the original exodus theology (M osala 1989:20) . U sing 'the struggle' as herm eneutical lens allows one to tell why certain sections of the Bible ham per the liberation process. Instead of sharing the 'universal abstract' (Mosala 1989 :26) assumption of classic Western theology that the whole Bible is the Word of God, liberation theology can, by applying the ypdstick of 'the struggle', discern the liberation trajectory running through the Bible -albeit 'und ern eath ' the present biblical text or even in the societies 'behind' the text (M osala 1989:27) . So, for in stance, the liberating message of Isaiah 61:1-7 has been reworked according to the 'ruling class ideology ' (M osala 1989:38) . This is why it is imperative to speak about biblical messages rather than of the biblical message, about biblical Gods rather than about the biblical God. The Bible bears witness to more than one God: the G od of the oppressed as well as to the God of the oppressor. It is for this reason that the Bible cannot be read as a 'bill of rights' o [ as an 'ontological product' in which 'the human dignity of all people...is ontologically inscribed' (Mosala 1989:29) .
It is thus not enough just to be 'existentially committed to the struggle of the oppressed...One must also effect a theoretical break with the assumptions and perspec tives of the dom inant discourse of a stratified society' (M osala 1989:39), including certain methods of sociological analysis (M osala 1989:43ff, 55-65) used to interpret the Bible. Mosala does not object to the fact that biblical scholars hold particular ideologi cal and political views or that they use sociological methods in the interpretation of the Bible. It is humanly impossible to live without such convictions, and sociological interpretations of the Bible can indeed be fruitful. W hat he pleads for is that bibli cal scholars should openly acknowledge their class interests, so that the perspective from which they interpret the Bible may become exphcit and the social limitations of the methods they use apparent (Mosala 1989:65) .*
J Discussion
Mosala takes the role of the reader seriously, discards epistemologically problematic dichotom ies (such as eternal-historical, subject-object and exposition-application) and rightly em phasises the historical nature of biblical witness and human under standing. T hat one cannot speak about the Bible in the abstract, but only o f the Bible-in-function and of the Bible as it is used -as Van Wyk also asserts -is a wel come insight. He rightly criticizes traditional Western biblical hermeneutics of be ing by and large unaware of the ideological nature and implications of its presuppo sitions. His insight that traditional theology, even though it professes the whole Bible to be the W ord of God, always operates with a canon within the canon, with out supplying convincing arguments for the relevant selectivity, is also useful. He is neither negatively inclined towards 'philosophy' as are Potgieter and Van Wyk, nor afraid to adm it the ideological nature of his stance, and consequently accepts the theoretical relativity of biblical interpretation.
Mosala's critical approach takes us a long way towards becoming aware of what
we are doing when we read the Bible, thereby urging biblical in terp reters to put their presuppositions 'on the table' and make conscious choices. It certainly is not enough to admit that one works from certain presuppositions and then to simply ig nore their influence on one's interpretation. M osala's book does raise a num ber of questions, though. He discards the no tion 'the Word of G od', because that term entails, to his mind, the notions of eter nal, ahistorical truth and a particular form of authority. This is, of course, not neces sarily true. 'W ord of G o d ' can be defined in various ways and has in fact been defined differently over the centuries (Deist 1978) .
Mosala seems to be reacting against a particular definition of the term -probab ly the traditional Methodist or South African notion. But the term 'Word of G od' is not without its own history. H ad Mosala followed Van Wyk's example by critically discussing the history of that term over the centuries and (unlike Van Wyk) in va rious theological traditions, he would perhaps have found other interpretations of the term that would relate the Bible to G od without severing 'W ord of G od' from human history.
F E D á s t
•
The rest of Mosala's book deals with Ihe exposition of a maleriaUst reading strategy and its practi cal apphcation to the book of Micah and a section from Luke.
The Bible in disaissioa
It is not clear whether Mosala takes the rem ainder of the Bible (that is, what is left after its dissection by the herm eneutical key of 'struggle') as in any way related to G od or w hether he somehow operates with a concept of divine revelation -how ever Sveak' and relative the definition of such revelation.
M osala (1989:28) does speak o f a theology o f struggle, bu t fails to say what forms the basis of this f/ieology. H e also argues (M osala 1989:28) that the Bible bears witness to several Gods -thereby implying that not all of them could be ac cepted as the true G od -but fails to explain the relationship between G od and the Bible. He also speaks about the function of the Bible in communities o f faith (M o sala 1989:192) , but he fails to be explicit about the role of faith in biblical interpreta tion. H e thus keeps us in the dark regarding the connections betw een G od, the Bible, theology, faith and Bible readers, and does not explain why the Bible could help us in any way to relate our lives to the will of God. It is precisely in order to get to grips with these questions of relationship that the traditional church speaks about inspiration and authority, and it is these ques tions th e two o th e r a u th o rs discuss -a lb e it along lines which M osala rightly criticises. It is one thing to criticize traditional Western theology -and Mosala does this very effectively -but criticism of solutions should not supply a licence to ignore the problem. M osala would perhaps argue th at the struggle as herm eneutical lens follows from one's ideological preference, and one has to applaud his frankness with regard to his materialist sociopolitical position. But his analysis of society -which seems to provide the canonical yardstick for what is to be selected from the Bible as the will of G od (?) -is from the viewpoint of methodology not really that different from other possible analyses, for it is founded on just another abstract W estern social theory which has not been developed from within the struggle itself. The inventor of the philosophy of historical materialism was a middle-class student of law and philo sophy, a lecturer and newspaper editor, who devised his theory in the confines of the British Museum. W hat, then, m akes his social theory superior to oth er theories devised by other middle-class university lecturers confined to their studies? This may be a crucial question.
As a social theory, historical materialism is as abstract and reductionist as idea lism. 1 admit that m aterialism is a very convenient theory for conscientisation, the fight against exploitation, the explanation of some revolutions and even for disco vering certain social powers at work in the societies in which the Bible originated, but convenience is not a rational category. If such a choice is simply a m atter of faith, we end up in another form of fideism, of which traditional conservative Wes tern theology may also be accused. A last point: Like M osala's 'lens', A frikaner civil religion, which produced the ideology of apartheid, had also been born in fairly radical opposition to current theological traditions and social theories and had, like Mosala's hermeneutics, been based upon the consciously chosen herm eneutical lens of 'the people'. A few quota tions will illustrate my point (see Deist 1990 for details). Lategan (1944:13) We all know today, half a century later, the consequences of this herm eneutical novelty. I am not accusing Mosala o f re-erecting a sort of black counterpart for 'Boerecalvinism e'. I am simply pointing out certain p arallels to ea rlie r South African attem pts at creating an 'own', somewhat partisan, lens for scriptural interpretation, and plead for a hard look at the possible consequences of the new, 'own' lens Mosa la proposes.
O ne could thus say that Mosala's criticism of the unreflective nature of traditio nal W estern theology is necessary, to the point and effective, but that he does not put all the cards on the table regarding his view o f Scripture and theology or regard ing the rational arguments fo r the choice o f his hermeneutical lens. Some im portant things are thus missing from his herm eneutics as well, not the least of which is a prognosis of the consequences of such scriptural interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The only common ground between the three authors, it seems, is the fact that each, for his own reasons, reflects on the Bible and its interpretation. And th at is too small a basis for any meaningful discussion. It is thus as yet too early to prepare a round table for them.
If we had to identify a few items on which talks about talks could perhaps take place, we could mention the following. First of all, the two R eform ed authors would have to take a fresh look at the naive realist an d /o r positivist epistemology underlying the presuppositions they take for granted. It is this epistemology that causes the problem of 'subjectivity' versus 'objectivity^ -a problem which both these authors failed to solve. Perhaps they can learn from Mosala not to fear or to be suspicious of 'philosophy', but to put all their philosophical cards on the table. Secondly, these two scholars will have to take Mosala's point of the ideological nature of presuppositions and herm eneutics seriously. For instance, I suspect that the notion of authority underlying their presentations flows from the authoritarian (perhaps even colonial) culture in which they grew up, and perhaps also from a mea sure of anxiety stemming from a (subconscious) feeling of 'loss of control' over the theological (and political?) scene. One has to be very honest here, because such un named feelings of superiority or fear can seriously misdirect talks. They should per
The BiUc ■■ dkoH iioa haps consider M osala 's (1989:192) rem ark; 'South A frica is probably the best, though not the only, m odem example of a country in which the ruling political group has consciously developed a biblical herm eneutics that reproduces and sustains its ideological and political interests.' Thirdly, the R eform ed scholars will have to reconsider the im plications o f the profession that G od revealed himself in human history and through ordinary human beings. They may then find it much more difficult to formulate a theory on inspira tion that will, at the sam e time, safeguard their notion of revelation and authority and leave room for G od's radical historical incarnation.* Mosala seems to take this historical incarnation seriously, since he even accepts that ordinary hum an power struggles are reflected in Biblical texts, while the two Reform ed scholars -Potgieter more so than Van Wyk -seem to be uneasy with the reality of the human form of G od's Word in Scripture and seem to prefer a less human Bible.
Fourthly, the two Reform ed scholars will have to adm it that there is hardly any doctrinal or ethical stance which will be supported by the whole Bible. That is, they will have to admit that the Bible often provides us with more than one answer to our questions and that it is difficult -if not sometimes impossible -to find a yardstick by which to measure these views. This insight will urge them to search more seriously for a way of evaluating biblical pronouncements.
Fifthly, Mosala will have to rethink the question of why we read the Bible, after all. He rightly stresses the human nature of the texts we read, but he does not tell why the Bible is im portant or relevant. The incorrect definition of term s (such as 'revelation' or 'W ord of G od') does not imply the falsity of the notion expressed by them. H e should perhaps spell out in more detail his views on revelation and faith and their relation to biblical hermeneutics.
Sixthly, Mosala should, while inculcating the consequences of earlier attem pts at using a partisan lens in biblical hermeneutics, advance rational argum ents for choos ing his herm eneutical key. M aterialism may be a very useful tool to certain ends but, as the saying goes, 'If the only tool you have is a ham m er, you tend to treat everything as if it were a nail'. Materialism will keep on providing the same anwers to questions, thereby ignoring the variety contained in the Bible. An ideologically re duced Bible will certainly make any talks impossible. Should we not perhaps take the contradictory nature of the Bible regarding social issues more seriously, and de vise a hermeneutic that can handle these contradictions, rather than to reduce or re write the Bible?
F E D á s t • Van Wyk (1989:46) is somewhat sceptical about the analogy between incarnation and inscripturation, but this analogy -if treated as an analogy -can throw some light on the issue of the human nature of Scripture. See, for instance, Deist (1986) , where a whole chapter is devoted to the subject.
T he B U c in d isciissioa
In the seventh place M osala should perhaps, on the grounds advanced under section 3.3, reconsider his non-negotiable stance regarding m aterialism as the only really valid herm eneutical strategy, and acknowledge its theoretical, and therefore relative, nature. A non-negotiable stance inevitably renders any talks senselesseven among liberation theologians. Perhaps he should clarify his rem ark (M osala 1989:192) that in a society as divided as ours there 'm ust certainly be a plurality of biblical herm eneutics', for it is not clear w hether he states a fact or paints an ideal state of affairs. If black theology can only be done on the basis of an ideologically, epistem ologically, and theoretically d ifferen t biblical herm eneutics ' as M osala (1989:192) concludes, we are faced with completely different paradigms. If this is so, I see little prospect for white and black theologies to strive towards any sort of com mon goal, or for any meaningful discussion to take place.
